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1 Introduction
The poor are less likely to avail of banking facilities. Over 35% of low income
households in the US do not have a bank account (as against a national aver-
age of 10%, Washington (2004)). These gures are typically much higher in
low income countries Paulson and McAndrews (1999) report that, relative
to a national mean of 50%, 73% of low income South African households are
without bank accounts. Within low income countries, the group most likely
to be excluded from the banking sector is the rural poor.
A belief that the welfare costs of exclusion from the banking sector,
especially for the rural poor, are high has led to widespread government
intervention in the banking sector of low income countries (Besley 1995).
Examples of such interventions range from interest rate ceilings on lending
to the poor to state-led branch expansion in rural areas. However, whether
such interventions actually improve the access of the poor to banks, help
alleviate poverty, or both, remains widely debated (see Adams et al 1984).
Between bank nationalization in 1969 and the onset of nancial liberal-
ization in 1990, government regulation of the banking sector in India sought
to a¤ect bank location and lending practices so as to favor the poor. This
paper summarizes results from two studies based on the Indian social bank-
ing experiment (Burgess and Pande 2004, and Burgess, Pande and Wong
2004 ). We use state-level data to show that rural branch expansion in In-
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dia was associated with signicant reductions in rural poverty. In addition,
household data demonstrate that, during the years of the social banking pro-
gram, bank borrowing among rural manual labor households was higher in
states which saw more rapid rural branch expansion. We also show that the
program increased access of lower caste and tribal households to bank loans.
Taken together, these ndings suggest that regulation of the Indian banking
sector played a key role in directing bank credit towards the poor, and that
easier access to bank credit and saving opportunities was associated with a
signicant decline in rural poverty.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the features of
the Indian social banking program relevant for our analysis. Section 3 sum-
marizes the state level analysis, and Section 4 uses quinquennial household
surveys, 1983-1999, to examine the e¢ cacy of directed lending targets in
increasing bank access for the poor. Section 5 concludes.
2 Program Description
The twenty years starting with the nationalization of the ten largest com-
mercial banks in 1969 and ending with the onset of nancial liberalization
in 1990 marked the heyday of the Indian social banking program.
At the point of bank nationalization, the Indian central bank committed
to increasing bank presence in rural areas and to equalizing population per
bank branch across Indian states. As part of this endeavor, in 1977 it im-
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posed a 1:4 branch license policy which required banks to open four branches
in rural unbanked locations for every branch opened in an already banked
(typically urban) location. This policy was discontinued in 1990, with the
onset of nancial liberalization. Between 1977 and 1990, this policy was as-
sociated with relatively greater rural branch expansion in states with lower
initial nancial development. After the policy was disbanded in 1990, rural
branch expansion into unbanked locations ended.1
A second feature of the Indian social banking program was an emphasis
on directed bank lending towards sectors deemed as priority sectors(these
included agriculture and small scale industries), and within these sectors to
individuals belonging to weaker sections of society. The latter included
members of the historically disadvantaged scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes (SC/ST). In 1980 the Indian central bank formalized its directed lend-
ing policy by requiring that, by 1985, 40% of all bank lending go to priority
sectors. Moreover, 25% of this lending must go to individuals belonging to
the weaker sections. While these targets remain to date, bank compliance
with these targets sharply reduced after nancial liberalization. Figure 1
shows that priority sector lending as a share of total bank lending peaked
at 40% in 1987, and steadily declined after 1990 to roughly half the peak
level by 1997. This deterioration in compliance has been widely linked to
1Branches which were the only one serving a given census location, however, could not
be closed down.
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the central banks focus on bank prots as the main performance indicator
post-1990 (Nair 1997). Figure 2 presents the time line of key banking pol-
icy changes in India and indicates the years for which household data are
available.
3 State level evidence
In Burgess and Pande (2004) we use a 1961-2000 state-level panel data-
set on states initial nancial development (measured by the number of
bank branches per capita in 1961), the number of branches opened in rural
unbanked locations, and rural headcount ratios to examine whether rural
branch expansion a¤ected rural poverty.
Our empirical strategy builds on the observation that, between 1977 and
1990, the 1:4 branch license policy caused banks to open relatively more
branches in nancially less developed states. The opposite was true outside
this period. Column (1) of Table 1 documents this fact.
Column (2) provides reduced form evidence on the relationship between
branch expansion and rural poverty outcomes. Between 1977 and 1990, -
nancially less developed states witnessed relatively higher poverty reduction.
The reverse was true outside this period (i.e. pre-1977 and post-1990).
There is no evidence that other state- or national-level public policies
exhibited trend breaks in 1977 and 1990. This motivates our use of the
deviations, between 1977 and 1990, and post-1990, from the pre-program
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linear trend relationship between states initial nancial development and
rural branch expansion as instruments for the number of rural bank branches
opened in unbanked locations.2 Column (3) reports our results. The opening
of rural bank branches across Indian states led to a signicant fall in rural
poverty, and can explain roughly half the fall in rural poverty between 1961
and 2000. In column (4) we exclude the pre-1977 period and show our results
our robust to only using the 1990 trend break as an instrument. Relative
to the 1977-1990 period, the discontinuation of rural branch expansion post
1990 was associated with a relative slowing down of rural poverty reduction
in nancially less developed states.
4 Household evidence
Our state-level analysis of the poverty impact of the social banking program
does not answer the question of whether the program succeeded in increasing
bank lending to the poor.3 To examine this, we use data from quinquen-
nial Indian NSS household surveys (employment/unemployment modules)
in 1983, 1987, 1993 and 1999 (Burgess, Pande and Wong (2004)). These
surveys contain loan information for rural labor households.4 Rural labor
2The rst stage regression for this IV procedure is column (1) of Table 1.
3For instance, our state-level results remain consistent with a trickle down story where
the poor benet indirectly from loans made to better o¤ households.
4Loan information is unavailable for other rural households, or before 1983. Hence,
we cannot look at the impact of the introduction of the social banking program or at the
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households are dened as households which earn at least 50% of their in-
come from wage paid manual labor in rural areas. Across the four survey
rounds the average real monthly per capita expenditure of these households
is Rs.326.75 which is signicantly lower than that of rural households taken
as whole (Rs. 392.49). Within rural labor households, SC/ST households
are even poorer, with a monthly per capita expenditure of Rs. 307.57.
For each surveyed rural labor household we know total debt outstand-
ing, the source(s) of the debt and purpose(s) for which debt was acquired.
Across our four surveys, we nd that roughly 33% of rural labor households
in our sample are indebted. 23% of the debt of indebted households was
from formal sources; banks (11%), cooperatives (8%), government (4%) and
72% from informal sources; moneylenders (22%), shopkeeper/trader (21%),
relatives/friends (16%) and employer/landlord (13%).
Figures 3A and 3B graph, by survey round, results from nonparametric
regressions of incidence of bank borrowing against real household expendi-
ture per capita. In Figure 3A incidence of bank borrowing is measured as
the probability of having a bank loan, and in Figure 3B by the share of total
household debt coming from banks. In both cases we observe, for each year,
a non-linear relationship between household expenditure and incidence of
bank borrowing. Households below the poverty line are less likely to ob-
tain bank loans than those above. The likelihood of having a bank loan is
banking activities of non-labor households.
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increasing with expenditure among the relatively poor and decreasing with
expenditure among the relatively rich. Most striking is the relatively con-
stant incidence of bank borrowing among the middle class in our sample.
A possible explanation is that directed lending targets implied that middle
income rural labor households were equally eligible for bank loans.
The thesis that social banking a¤ected bank borrowing patterns across
the income distribution is also consistent with the inter-temporal pattern
in bank borrowing. Rural branch expansion and directed lending witnessed
their highest growth between 1983 and 1987 and steadily declined in the
1990s. The incidence of bank borrowing among rural labor households mir-
rors this pattern it is highest in 1987, next highest in 1983 and monoton-
ically lower in the 1990s.
To further probe the impact of the social banking program on household
borrowing we turn to a regression analysis. We estimate probit regressions
of the form
Yijt = j + t + t Bj1961 + Xijt + ijt
where Yijt is a dummy for whether household i in state j in year t has at
least one outstanding loan, and Xijt a vector of household characteristics.
j denote state xed e¤ects, and t year xed e¤ects. Bj1961, our measure
of initial nancial development, denotes the number of bank branches per
capita in state j in 1961. This variable enters the regression interacted with
year dummies, with t denoting the year-specic coe¢ cients (the omitted
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reference year is 1983). t is informative of how, relative to 1983, a states
initial nancial development a¤ects borrowing behavior.
As column (1) of Table 1 shows states initial nancial development is
a determinant of rural branch expansion. Moreover, relative to the 1977-
1989 period, the nature of this relationship reversed after 1990. Thus, by
examining whether the impact of states initial nancial development on
household borrowing varies by type of borrowing and over time we can pro-
vide indirect evidence on whether rural branch expansion a¤ected borrowing
patterns. The advantage of focussing on this reduced form relationship is
that we can avoid the endogeneity concerns associated with directly using
the number of rural bank branches as an explanatory variable. For consis-
tency, we restrict our analysis to the sixteen major Indian states considered
in the state-level analysis, and cluster standard errors at the village level.
Table 2 reports the results. In column (1) the dependent variable is
whether the household has any outstanding loans. The overall incidence
of borrowing is higher in nancially more developed states. This is consis-
tent with the observation that nancially more developed states tend to be
richer states. This e¤ect persists when we consider propensity to borrow
from the informal sector as the dependent variable in column (2). However,
in column (3) we observe the opposite is true of bank borrowing. Relative
to 1983, a rural labor household in a nancially less developed state was
more likely to receive a bank loan in 1987 and 1993. However, by 1999
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the propensity to borrow from a bank and statesinitial nancial develop-
ment were uncorrelated. As discussed in Section 3, Indian states with lower
initial nancial development witnessed greater rural branch expansion only
between 1977 and 1990. Our results point to the rural branch expansion
program having improved relatively poor householdsaccess to banks. Af-
ter the branch expansion program ended in 1990, albeit with a lag, states
initial nancial development and householdsability to borrow from banks
became uncorrelated.
The regressions in Table 2 include controls for household head charac-
teristics and household demographics. Economic disadvantage, as proxied
by being landless and having an illiterate household head reduced a house-
holds likelihood of overall borrowing, and bank borrowing, but not informal
sector borrowing. However, we observe that SC/ST households which are
also economically disadvantaged were signicantly more likely to get bank
loans.5
A possible explanation for the positive SC/ST e¤ect is the fact the pri-
ority sector lending program targeted SC/ST households. By 1985 banks
were required to lend 10% of net bank credit to weaker sectionsof society,
prominent amongst which were SC/ST households. To further explore this
idea, we re-estimate the above regression including the interactions between
the year dummies and SC/ST dummy. Figure 4A plots the year-wise co-
5SC/ST households make up 46% of all rural labor households.
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e¢ cients from a regression where the dependent variable is the probability
of obtaining a bank loan. Relative to 1983, the probability of a SC/ST
household obtaining a bank loan is signicantly higher in 1987 but not in
the 1990s. SC/ST households are 2% more likely to get a bank loan in 1987
relative to 1983 which represents a 49% increase relative to the 1983 sample
mean of 4.1% . In Figure 4B the dependent variable is the probability of
having an informal sector loan. Here, we observe the opposite e¤ect. Rel-
ative to 1983, the probability of a SC/ST household obtaining an informal
loan is signicantly lower only in 1987. This evidence is consistent with the
idea that the social banking program in the 1980s succeeded in increasing
SC/ST households access to bank loans, and in reducing their reliance on
informal lending.
5 Conclusion
The Indian social banking program was amongst the largest state-led credit
programs ever attempted in a low income country. This paper combines
state and household data to o¤er some simple insights into the Indian social
banking programs impact on economic outcomes and household borrowing
behavior. State level analysis for the period 1961-2000 demonstrates that
rural branch expansion in India signicantly lowered rural poverty. House-
hold analysis shows that rural labor households, especially SC/ST house-
holds, were much less likely to obtain bank loans once the emphasis on
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social banking was reduced.
Arguably, the key elements of the social banking program which con-
tributed to its success in reaching the poor were the expansion of the rural
branch network and directed lending towards weaker sections in Indian soci-
ety. However, it is important to end with a word of caution. To achieve this
reduction in poverty the Indian state invested substantial resources into the
development of a state banking sector. Whether the same level of poverty
reduction could be achieved at lower cost through some other intervention in
credit markets (e.g. micronance) or in a di¤erent sector (e.g. land reform)
remains an open research question.
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1977-2000
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number branches opened in rural -- -- -4.74** -6.84***
unbanked locations per capita (1.79) (2.81)
Number of bank branches in 1961 0.07** -0.77*** -0.47 -0.79*
per capita *(1961-2000) trend (0.03) (0.23) (0.26) (0.44)
Number of bank branches in 1961 -0.25*** 1.15** -- --
per capita*(1977-2000) trend (0.03) (0.42)
Number of bank branches in 1961 0.17*** -1.15*** -- --
per capita*(1990-2000) trend (0.04) (0.34)
Adjusted R-squared 0.96 0.84 0.78 0.80
Number observations 636 627 627 375
Number of branches at 
rural unbanked 
locations 1961-2000
Table 1. Rural Branch expansion and poverty reduction - State level evidence 
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include as other controls population density, log state income per 
capita, log rural locations per capita (measured in 1961), a linear time trend with breaks at years 1977 and 1990, year fixed effects and state fixed 
effects. Branch variables are normalized by 1961 population. Rural bank credit (saving) share is the percent of total bank credit (saving) 
accounted for by rural branches. The sample covers 16 states (1961-2000). Haryana enters in 1965. * indicates significance at 10%, ** 
significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%. 
Rural head count ratio
Source Overall Informal Bank
(1) (2) (3)
SC/ST 0.012*** 0 0.009***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
Illiterate -0.022*** -0.004 -0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Landless -0.036*** -0.008 -0.011***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
Number of bank branches in 1961 0.034*** 0.026** -0.011***
per capita*1987 year dummy (0.013) (0.013) (0.004)
Number of bank branches in 1961 0.025* 0.016 -0.011***
per capita*1993 year dummy (0.014) (0.013) (0.004)
Number of bank branches in 1961 0.103*** 0.079*** 0
per capita*1999 year dummy (0.014) (0.013) (0.004)
Household demographics YES YES YES
Year and State fixed effects YES YES YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.07
Number of observations 75888 75888
Marginal coefficients reported. Robust standard errors clustered by village are in parenthesis. Household 
demographics include household size, male adult and children shares in household,  and age of household head 
(in levels and quadratic). * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%. 
Table 2. Social Banking and Household Borrowing Behavior
Probit 
Figure 1: Priority Sector Lending As a Share of Total Bank Lending, 1980-1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Timeline of Social Banking Program, 1969-1990 
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Figure 3A: Probability of Having a Bank Loan, by Year 
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This graph displays results from locally weighted, non-parametric regressions of a bank loan dummy on 
real per capita monthly household expenditure for all rural labour households with household heads aged 
25-80 by year. The bottom and top 1 percent of the per capita household expenditure distribution in the full 
sample of rural households are excluded from the sample.  
 
 
 
Figure 3B: Bank Borrowing As Share of Total Borrowing, by Year 
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This graph displays results from locally weighted, non-parametric regressions of the share of bank 
borrowing in total borrowing on real per capita monthly household expenditure for all indebted rural labour 
households with household heads aged 25-80 by year. The bottom and top 1 percent of the per capita 
household expenditure distribution in the full sample of rural households are excluded from the sample.  
 
 
Figure 4A: Probability of SC/ST Having Bank Loan 
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Solid line represents the marginal differences due to SC/ST status in the probability of having a bank loan 
by year, obtained from Probit regressions of a bank loan dummy on SC/ST-year interactions. Dotted lines 
describe the 95% confidence interval. Other controls in the Probit regressions are as in Table 2.  
 
Figure 4B: Probability of SC/ST Having Informal Sector Loan 
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Solid line represents the marginal differences due to SC/ST status in the probability of having a loan from 
the informal sector by year, obtained from Probit regressions of an informal loan dummy on SC/ST-year 
interactions. Dotted lines describe the 95% confidence interval. Other controls in the Probit regressions are 
as in Table 2. 
